Abstract: Ten years after the emergence of the World Wide Web, the implications of new digital technologies for the news and public information function of the media are still a topic of vigorous debate. This paper, which is merely a preliminary report on an unfinished review of the literature pre-dating that event, revisits some of the critical analyses that had been articulated about the new digital media when the Web emerged. The intent of this larger, not-yet-completed project is to evaluate some major tendencies, already mapped a decade ago by research in the political economy of telecommunication, against the actual outcomes of the intervening decade of development and use of the new digital technologies of information and communication. Where the early predictions are confirmed, this re-evaluation may provide a simple means to distinguish persistent structural distortions in the public information environment from transitory or local effects, superficial influences, and alarmist predictions. Where the early results are refuted or less clearly confirmed, it may provide insight into the limits of political-economic methods of analysis.
Introduction
A decade ago, as the World Wide Web emerged, many cultural and political philosophers, and many human rights and social justice activists, had begun to see great promise in the rise of the Internet and other digital media, in terms of their potential to contribute to the fidelity of the public information processes that ground the democratic ideal. Some went so far as to herald the arrival of a utopian "information society" in which decentralized control of information collections and data processing equipment would progressively erase the inherited political and economic structures which sustain traditional forms of dominance and authority (see, for example, de Sola Pool, 1983) . But other observers, critical political economists in particular, already viewed the new digital media as instruments largely designed for intensified new forms of dominance, through commercial surveillance and control of worker and consumer behaviour (see Samarajiva, 1992; Mosco & Wasco, 1988) . While there was clear agreement that significant political, economic, social, and cultural transformations could be predicted to accompany the spread of the new communication and information technologies (CITs hereafter), opinions varied widely as to whether these changes would likely be authoritarian or emancipatory in character.
In this paper I propose to revisit some of the critical analyses of that period.
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The major tendencies that had been mapped before 1993 by research in the political economy of telecommunication can now be evaluated against the actual outcomes of the intervening decade of development and use of the new digital technologies of information and communication. I see two reasons for undertaking such an exercise. First, where the early results are confirmed, this re-evaluation may provide a simple means to distinguish persistent structural distortions in the public information environment, from transitory or local effects, superficial influences, and alarmist predictions. Second, where the early results are refuted or less clearly confirmed, it may also provide an interesting test of the explanatory power of political-economic methods of analysis. Note that this discussion will be primarily concerned with the implications of the new CITs for the study of the news media and the public information function of the media generally. That is to say, it does not attempt to consider broader socio-cultural implications of the new media, beyond their possible impact on processes of citizenship. A first implication of the new CITs for the study of the "news," or public information function, of media, however, is that we are now faced with the migration of a whole range of social institutions into complexly mediated settings, and this now makes it quite difficult to draw a clear and bright line around that particular set of mediated practices constitutive of the "public information function." A hospital's Website during a public health crisis may now as readily provide some kinds of urgent public knowledge to citizens, as the daily newspaper.
Instead of attempting to rank and evaluate each of the multitudinous contemporary sources of public information, my strategy will be to revisit those earlier analyses in terms of three broad features of the digital media environment: inter-activity, audience fragmentation, and uneven development. I will try to draw out the prior expected implications of each of these features for the structure of public information flows, and then to assess their accuracy in the light of the passage of a decade of digital media development. Both review and assessment, however, must be limited to a bare sketch of what the completed project is expected to reveal.
Interactivity
The most obvious novel characteristic of the digital media as newsmedia is that they are interactive. In the inherited forms of mass media (radio, TV, press), the members of a large audience were seen as engaging simultaneously and anonymously with materials originating from and scheduled by a central source; but could not themselves reply to source, or address the other members of the audience (except on rare and privileged occasions, such as published letters to the editor). The digital media, in contrast, were seen by communications analysts, well before the emergence of the Web, to permit varying degrees of audience control of time and topic, distributed storage of information and programming, and switched multi-modal message-addressing capabilities (McQuail, 1986) .
The new CITs thus appeared to make possible a variety of new forms of interaction, embodied in digital media services such as pay-per-view television, videoon-demand, and videoconferencing; and in distributed activities supported by digital platforms, such as telebanking, teleshopping, telework, and telelearning. The early internet protocol (IP)-based services, such as electronic mail, bulletin board, listserv, and conferencing systems, as well as pre-World Wide Web archive and hypertext browsing systems such as "gopher" and "mosaic", also contributed some noted potential for interactivity to the public information media environment at that time, for a small minority of the populations of the "economic north."
The "addressability" of the digital media-the fact that each user is identified with a location in a switched network that is capable of routing digital signals between any two (or more) network locations-is the underlying characteristic of digital media which made these emergent forms of mediated interaction possible. Because the existing telecommunications infrastructure already provided ubiquitous circuit-switched network services, and because this industry began experimenting with digital multiplexing of some elements, especially telemetry, in its networks as early as the mid-1970s, the telecommunications industry became central to the roll-out of the new digital infrastructure, and began to strategize a large role for itself in the provision of media content services (for example, Bell Globemedia) for the first time since the break-up of the telegraph/newswire monopolies in the 1860s. This is an important part of the background of the recent so-called "convergence" initiatives, and arguably drove the technology-led market bubble of the late 1990s, and the market crash of 2000/2001. In the early 1990s, the telecom networks ran on proprietary standards and had a rigid hierarchical switching architecture, and until a few years later it was not clear that IP network standards were likely to prevail over these proprietary standards. This unpredicted shift had both technical and business reasons. In particular, information and communication planning within large Multi-National Corporations (MNC) in many sectors eventually tipped the standard-setting process away from the proprietary standards of the telecoms firms, and towards open standards that other sectors could appropriate, especially IP. This struggle is being played out again in the current period in the arena of wireless digital communication, especially between the Global Standard for Mobile (GSM) and Code-Divided Multiplex Architecture (CDMA) telephony standards.
But this earlier shift led to a higher level of interoperability of landline-based digital media services, and a much lower level of demand for bundled services, than seemed likely in the view of many political economists at the time. What they expected to emerge from the proprietary-standard strategies of the incumbent telecom firms was a landscape of captive closed user groups for the new services, and a resulting acceleration of merger and acquisition activity between the telecom sector and other sectors of capital (along with the monopoly rents to pay for the new infrastructure). Instead, open standards were adopted.
The shift to IP has also done considerable damage to share values in the telecoms sector, at least for the time being. But clearly it was strategic rivalry between sectors of industrial capital which actually drove the adoption of open standards and the development of digital infrastructure throughout the last decade.
Still, the interactivity of the digital media seemed, at first sight and to more utopian observers, to hold enormous potential for democratization of the media's public information function. For example, the audience's powers of selection and autonomy from editorial "gatekeeping" ought to be dramatically increased by systems which equip users to originate and distribute information programming, as well as to receive it, and to respond directly to information and programming sources. Indeed, "flat" or horizontal organizational structures, participatory selfmanagement, smallness of scale, and "situatedness" of geographic place and cultural context-all of which have been argued in the organizational communication literature (Rosegger, 1991) to be intrinsic characteristics of effective "interactive network organizations"-are themselves recognizable elements of any elaborated concept of participatory democracy.
Such observers, a decade ago, saw much evidence that the emergence of the digital media had opened new spaces for the production and dissemination of alternative and oppositional texts, and breathed new life into the democratic process within citizen groups and voluntaristic social movements. Medium-sized, small, and "micro" enterprises, regional, and local governments, schools, and universities, and entire social movements became significant users of digital communication networks. Examples of such uses were observed at that time in the intensive Internet usage of universities, libraries, and researchers in many countries, in early initiatives like Peacenet, Greennet, Schoolnet, et cetera, in the Freenet movement, devoted to providing free access to the new media for lowerincome citizens, and in local experiments such as the Santa Monica, California civic network, linking city residents for "town-hall" debate and access to munic-ipal offices. Many of these initiatives have continued and evolved, and one need look no further than the recent practices of the anti-globalization movement, and related phenomena like IndyMedia, as well as the great number of specialized online newsletters, journals, and other fora of public debate to see their effectiveness in terms of public opinion formation, public policy deliberation, and citizen participation in the political process.
The view of political-economists of communication a decade ago was typically an enthusiastic embrace of these new opportunities for social communication, tempered with some pessimism about their longer-run potential to escape state and corporate control. One line of analysis investigated the invisible forms of gatekeeping that could be buried in the technological infrastructure of the emerging digital networks. An early example was provided by the development of "calling line identification" services by telephone providers, and their potential uses for "red-lining" consumers (Samarajiva, 1992; Samarajiva & Mukherjee, 1992) . Such gatekeeping possibilities are now multiplied in the context of executable files, search engines and "spiders", and "intelligent agent" software.
Another line of analysis proceeded by asking the question: How significant are these autonomous uses in comparison to their use by military and civilian functions of central governments, and by MNCs? One answer to this question was that in quantitative terms they were insignificant. Dorothy Riddle, for example, performed research as far back as the mid-1980s that allowed her to estimate that 70 -85% of worldwide data flows were internal to private intra-corporate MNC networks alone (Riddle, 1988) . Political-economy analysts went on to speculate that if or as the significance of autonomous network uses by citizens and citizen groups grows, so would the level of investment in targeting them for marketing purposes, policing them for property infringements, and generally infecting them with the "one-sided logic" of pure commercial intent.
Have these things happened? The evolution of marketing and advertising in the new media environment has given rise to a large body of research and literature, and it certainly cannot be summarized here. The general picture, though, is still probably a mixed one. In terms of the marketing imperative, commercial news organizations now routinely link their mass media news programming to proprietary on-line sites for viewer feedback and background information, and the intensity of advertising efforts in both spaces (the relative and absolute intensity of advertising for viewers) continues to develop, especially in face of the prospect of using the addressivity of digital networks (including High-Definition Television (HDTV) broadcasting) to amass huge volumes of valuable individuated customer data. However, no-one yet really seems to "have the recipe" for effective online advertising, revenues have not been meeting the optimistic projections of earlier days, and on-line users have yet to fully abandon their attachment to control of their personal data. And of course once on-line, it is extremely easy for audience members to wander off into new galaxies of information and participatory discussion.
In terms of policing the networks for intellectual property infringements, this has become a large issue, and it shows no sign of being settled in favour of an expanded public domain. The dispute over file-sharing arrangements like "Napster" and "Kazaa" has exposed the deep interests of corporate actors in establishing a fairly microscopic control of digital media spaces on intellectual property grounds, and recent legislative initiatives like the U.S. Copyright Term Extension Act and the U.S. Consumer Broadband Digital Telecom Protection Act have exposed the lengths to which State actors are readily willing to go to accommodate them. Here, so far, the early prognoses of critical political economy appear to be on the mark. And here again, MNC interests continue to drive the development of technical standards for the Internet.
Another area where this is true is with respect to the expected path of network rate regulation. Viewed from that earlier point (and quite aside from whether or not autonomous digital network use for the circulation of news and public information would become more widespread and sophisticated, or whether or not such uses would be colonized for commerce), already-visible trends in pricing and rate regulation strongly indicated that individual users were going to find themselves paying a highly disproportionate share of the fixed and variable overhead costs of the installed network capacity. Individual users were therefore seen to be subsidizing the large-scale institutional and corporate users. This was despite thencurrent and projected capacity oversupply. Those projections were correct, enormous expected demand that has not materialized drove infrastructure development throughout the 1990s, capacity oversupply is consequently still a fact-and yet this has not driven basic access prices down, and at most has caused deferrals of planned rate increases.
The pessimistic view of a decade ago also included the observation that, unfortunately, the "levelling" character of the digital media gives those concerned with issues of public interest no advantage over reactionary and anti-democratic interests. Network users arrive from all over the ideological map: the technology itself was not then and is not now intrinsically better-suited to the Council of Canadians' astonishingly effective use of digital networks to halt the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, than to the Neo-Nazi distribution of explicitly racist computer-game software (to take the example of one transborder data service of the early 1990s).
Finally, it seemed to political-economists before the emergence of the Web that increasing interactivity could also mean the progressive replacement of the "two-step flow" of mass media messages with a continuum of interaction settings, in which the information provided by one-way mass communication systems is compared against an array of preferred sources, and in which the interpretive activity of audience members becomes increasingly heterogeneous and idiosyncratic. While this is in part a celebrated aspect of the democratic potential of the new media, one possible outcome raised in early discussions was a feared breakdown of common national symbolic inventories, with attention to issues of public importance more likely to be based on commonalities of class, profession, and interest than of geography or citizenship (Turow, 1992a) . If the likelihood of reaching broad national audiences on common topics is reduced by increased interactivity of the media, this seems to signal a reduction in the scale, scope, and corrective political influence of the public sphere, as traditionally conceived. Where, then, are the real boundaries of the political unit to be drawn (a question first raised in relation to information flows by Karl Deutsch over a half-century ago)? How is the "public information environment" to be defined, in relation to digital media networks?
Audience fragmentation
This introduces the second characteristic in our brief retrospective survey of the reception of the new digital environment: the phenomenon of audience fragmentation and the continued evolution of closed user groups. Digital media flows are notoriously insensitive to geo-political boundaries, which, ten years ago, seemed to make possible and likely, as noted, the ascendancy of "communities of affinity" rather than "communities of vicinity," the former being supranational in their configuration and scope. These user groups were also seen as likely to be highly stratified in their membership, with entry to specialized networks (and access to highquality information and programming) constrained by filters of income and affiliation (Melody, 1993) . This, however, was in part the expected outcome of the continuing dominance of the protrietary network standards of the time. The shift to IP standards puts the extent and pace of fragmentation more in doubt.
Continuing audience fragmentation in the mass media, and the emergence of addressable niche markets in the digital media, suggested, at that earlier time, that a dynamic change was underway in the economic structure of media programming and information services. On the one hand it was possible to hypothesize that, as higher-income audience members and higher-quality programming were siphoned away to tiered specialty, pay-per-view, and on-demand video services, the value to advertisers of the residual audiences on the "free" public networks would drop and therefore also the advertising revenues of the public networks, and the quality of their programming, including news and public affairs programming.
On the other hand, the new niche audiences seemed to offer far more precisely targeted markets, and the addressability of the delivery technology promised to multiply the effectiveness of this surveillance capacity by generating volumes of priceless, individuated, direct-marketing data about viewer preferences and viewing patterns. HDTV is now being configured to accelerate this process; services like MS Passport threaten similar outcomes on-line.
Moreover, the fragmentation of audiences was at that earlier point predicted to advance the "globalization" of media services, in an effort by media firms to respond to international marketing demand (Turow, 1992b) . Messages designed for niche markets are more likely to be translatable across national political, cultural and linguistic boundaries than mass media messages, since they construct meanings from the common symbolic inventory of narrower professional, class, and interest groups, and need perhaps rely very little on mobilizing the themes and symbols of nationality. This had the implication that programming-finance resources for narrowcast and on-demand services could, when extended to global markets, rival those of national broadcast networks. (Murdoch's attempted assembly of soccer properties for his direct-broadcast satellite services is illustrative.) This also implied, of course, the attenuation in the broadcast environment of notions such as "public interest" and "issues of public importance," as the cultural integration and regulatory power of the state were dissolved in the norm-free gases of international cyberspace.
Has audience fragmentation happened? Briefly: yes, it is happening-but not as quickly as previously expected. It may also be tempered to some degree by cross-media concentration ("convergence") strategies, such as, in Canada, those of Bell and Global. Major advertisers are still able to exercise effective demand for large national audiences in their key markets, and integrated national media firms are still able to assemble them, especially through increasing the intensity of cross-marketing campaigns. Take-up of new digital subscription broadcast channels has been slow, and despite the relatively rapid penetration of broadband Internet services in many jurisdictions, the legal, commercial, and technical uncertainties of web-casting have limited the degree of migration to on-line substitutes for broadcast programming. Cable-casters' control over channel menus, and in some cases, regulatory barriers to foreign ownership and control of cable and DBS properties, may have helped preserve the audience share of dominant national media (at the cost of less-favourable access to capital markets). However, initiatives through international, regional, and bilateral trade regimes have been effective in some cases in relieving price pressures on the existing marketing system by limiting, and even knocking down, measures that prop up and subsidize domestic audience access for domestic media capital (for example, the Canadian loss in the split-run magazine dispute). Such shifts may in the longer run lead to the emergence of the large international niche audiences predicted in the earlier period.
Uneven development
Analysts concerned about the use of digital media as instruments of social control suggest that in general their deployment increases the economic dependence of less developed regions. Andrew Gillespie and Kevin Robins (1989) describe this process by showing how the new CITs "change the relational distances between places and, in so doing, help construct new economic and social geographies and new forms of spatial division and integration." The overall picture they present is a course of development featuring growing inequality between rich and poor nations and regions.
This echoes Harold Innis' account of the use of communications technologies to both extend and challenge existing monopoly structures. For example Innis, examining the relation of rail and telegraph diffusion to press competition between regions of England in the last half of the 19th century, noted that "the monopoly of London [newspapers] strengthened by the railway was destroyed by the telegraph which encouraged provincial competition" (1951, p.33; see also DuBoff, 1980 , for a complementary analysis of the U.S. history). Innis finds an interplay of resistance and consent in hinterland-metro pole relations, which he interprets as a desire, on the part of hinterland populations, both to resist the dominance of the metropolitan centre, and to gain access to products, ideas, and cultural goods from the metropolis. It's not difficult to transpose this perspective to analysis of peripheral-region uses of the new "telegraphic" technologies.
This view runs clearly counter to the idealist equation of technological progress with decentralized economic growth and general human bettermentthe "post-industrial" view which also asserts the decentralizing and prosperityinducing force of communications technology. In the Innisian view, and that of the critical political economists of telecommunication a decade ago, these "spacebinding" communications systems are instead associated with new forms of corporate organization and new competitive strategies for distant markets. These new forms of corporate organization exert determinative influence on the types of facilities and services developed, the patterns of their use, their regulatory regimes, and the opportunities for access which are created (Gillespie & Hepworth, 1987 ). Indeed, at every level, from initial planning and technical design to actual implementation, [digital networks] incarnate only the private interests of the transnational corporations that will engineer, supply, install and make use of the emerging global grid. (Schiller, 1985, p. 106) The evidence is pretty good on this point. For example, the spatial organization of the new telecommunications-based media, axially arranged around large cities, reflect the location needs of metropolitan corporations. Gillespie and Robins cited evidence from six industrial countries suggesting that developed metropolitan regions "have telematics equipment and services at levels markedly above national averages" (Gillespie & Robins, 1989, p. 13) . Studies in the late 1980s commissioned by the European Community corroborate the bias for core metropolitan regions, both in terms of the concentration of infrastructure, and in terms of the uptake and utilization of available services (Gillespie & Williams, 1988) . Recent Canadian federal government proposals to finance a private consortium to build and operate a high-speed rural and remote network can be understood in this context. Thus, rather than actors in peripheral regions taking up the new CITs to compensate for their locational disadvantages, these technologies tend more to favour the penetration of peripheral regions by centrally located organizations . . . . This penetration takes the form of a new geography of competition, with profound implications for interregional dependency relationships. (Gillespie and Robins, 1989, pp.13-14) These new dependencies arise at all scales of the centre-periphery structure, differentiating local urban and rural areas, sub-national regions, nation-states, and regions of the world. The net effect of the global digital networks on less-developed regions' news media and public information systems is to erase their residual spatial and informational "insulation" from centralized power systems and information sources, to flood their political communication systems with the political agenda of TNC interests, and to render them more effectively targeted as program, equipment, and consumer goods markets, and as sources of cheap and flexible labour.
Conclusions
Non-homogeneous network connectivity, differences in the economic value of the information flows within various demographic groups, and time lags in the replication of significant new knowledge in various parts of the global network, create a likelihood of opportunistic behaviour in the relationships between demographically distinct user groups and between advantaged and disadvantaged geographic locations. The evolution of multi-functioned digital networks therefore also may be expected to reproduce and intensify existing patterns and levels of economic, political, and cultural inequality and disentitlement.
While digital media as news media also offer discursive opportunities for organized resistance to these outcomes, such resistance may be marginalized by the commercial form of development of the new media. There is a clear disjuncture between the notion of digital media as instrument of participatory democracy -between the often hopeful and energetic efforts to employ the new technology in countering remote political authority and centralized economic power-and the analysis of communication technology as instrument of commercial dependency.
This appears to have been the pessimistic view from critical political economy a decade ago. Despite a few areas in which these low expectations have been only partly fulfilled so far, the general picture is still mostly consistent with the predictions that fall out from this very preliminary retrospective survey of that literature. Vigorous organized efforts to intervene in technology standard-setting processes, to claim the widest degree of free public access to the digital media, and to use those interventions and that access for the democratization of a wide range of social and economic institutions, will be necessary if the complete disappointment of democratic hopes for the new communications technologies is to be avoided.
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